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 ANTICOMMONS AND OPTIMAL PATENT POLICY
IN A MODEL OF SEQUENTIAL INNOVATION
GAST ON LLANESy AND STEFANO TRENTOz
Abstract. We present a model of sequential innovation in which
an innovator uses several research inputs to invent a new good.
These inputs, in turn, must be invented before they can be used
by the nal innovator. As a consequence, the degree of patent
protection aects the revenues and cost of the innovator, but also
determines the incentives to invent the research inputs in the rst
place. We study the eects of increases in the number of required
inputs on innovation activity and optimal patent policy. We nd
that the probability of introducing the nal innovation decreases
(increases) as the number of inputs increases when inputs are com-
plements (substitutes). We also nd that the optimal strength of
patents on research inputs is increasing in the degree of substitu-
tion between the inputs, but decreasing in the number of inputs
for any degree of substitution.
1. Introduction
Knowledge builds upon previous knowledge. This is true for most
innovations nowadays, especially in hi-tech industries like molecular
biology, plant biotechnology, semiconductors and software. In some
cases, the innovation consists of an improvement of an older version of
the same good. In other cases, the research leading to the discovery of
the new good depends on the access to research tools, techniques and
inputs which are previous innovations themselves.
In any case, innovation activity will in general depend on the access
to previous innovations. Depending on the structure of the patent
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system, some of these inventions will be protected by patents. This
means that patents aect not only the revenues of the innovator, but
also the cost of performing an innovation.
Recent concern has arisen on the possibility that patents (or other
kinds of Intellectual Property) can restrict access to research inputs,
hindering innovation as a consequence. The innovator and the owners
of patents on previous inventions share the revenues of the innova-
tion. As the number of inputs needed in research increases, the in-
novator faces a patent thicket and is threatened by the possibility of
hold-up, namely the risk that a useful innovation is not developed be-
cause of lack of agreement with the patent holders. This problem has
been dubbed the tragedy of the anticommons (Heller 1998, Heller and
Eisenberg 1998). When too many agents have exclusion rights over
the use of a common resource, this resource tends to be underutilized,
in clear duality with the tragedy of the commons in which too many
agents hold rights of use and the resource tends to be overused.
This problem may be particularly acute in biomedical research, where
there is a deep controversy over the patenting of gene fragments and
research tools. Take for example the case of the MSP1 antigen (Plas-
modium Falciparum Merozoite Specic Protein 1), widely recognized
as the most promising candidate for an anti-malarial vaccine. A study
of the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (2002) found more
than 39 patent families covering DNA fragments, methods for process-
ing fragments, production systems, vaccine delivery systems, etc. As a
consequence, a potential innovator willing to commercialize a vaccine
based on MSP1 must get prior permission from the owners of these
property rights.
Anticommons can arise in biotechnology as well. A good example is
Golden Rice, which required payment of up to 40 licenses, depending on
the country of commercialization (Gra, Cullen, Bradford, Zilberman,
and Bennett 2003).
As a nal example, consider the case of software patents, which cover
mathematical algorithms and techniques. Software programs have be-
come so complex that any single program may use thousands of al-
gorithms (Garnkel, Stallman, and Kapor 1991), possibly infringing a
large number of patents. This explains the expected increase in patent
litigation in this sector in the next years (think of Microsoft vs. the
programmers and users of Linux), and the formation of a Patent Com-
mons by rms involved in the Open Source community (IBM, HP,
Novel, Sun, etc.).
We address these issues by constructing a model of sequential inno-
vation in which an innovator uses n patented inputs to develop a newANTICOMMONS IN SEQUENTIAL INNOVATION 3
invention. Substitutability between the inputs goes from zero (per-
fect complements) to innity (perfect substitutes) and the input sellers
compete in prices but do not know the exact value of the innovation
for the innovator.
We study how the probability of performing the innovation changes
as technologies become more complex (n increases) and nd that it de-
creases when the inputs are market complements and increases when
they are market substitutes. Therefore, we prove that the anticommons
hypothesis may hold when inputs are essential and not easy to substi-
tute. Then, we analyze the limiting economy when n ! 1, and show
that the probability of innovation is always less than socially optimal
unless the inputs are perfect substitutes. Moreover, the probability of
innovation goes to zero when the elasticity of substitution is below a
threshold level which is higher than 1.
In the basic model, the research inputs have been already invented,
and are protected by strong patents. The government could reduce the
patent thicket by granting less patents, or by reducing patent breadth.
However, weaker patents imply a reduced incentive to discover research
inputs in the rst place. In Section 4, we turn to the analysis of optimal
patent policyr. Patent policy aects the division of prots between the
input innovators and the nal innovator. We obtain the patent policy
that maximizes the joint probability of inventing all the inputs and the
nal good. We nd that this optimal policy is decreasing in complexity:
when the number of inputs required in the R&D process increases, the
optimal response is to reduce patent strength.
There is an extended literature on Sequential Innovation, which is
mainly concerned with the optimal division of prots between sequen-
tial innovators. The main contribution of this paper is to extend the
analysis of patent policy and optimal division of prot when innovation
activity requires access to several prior inventions. As such, the two
key insights of the model are: (i) patents will be more harmful when re-
search inputs are complementary, and (ii) optimal patent policy should
decrease when innovations become more complex.
As we discuss in the following section, our paper is also related to
the literatures of complementary monopoly and patent pools. A patent
pool is a cooperative agreement among patent holders, through which
they agree on the licensing terms of a subset of their patents. In Section
5, we analyze the eects of the formation of patent pools on innovation
activity within our model, and study similarities and dierences of our
ndings with previous papers in this literature.4 LLANES AND TRENTO
1.1. Related literature. There is an extended literature on Sequen-
tial Innovation (Scotchmer 1991, Green and Scotchmer 1995, Chang
1995, Scotchmer 1996, Hopenhayn, Llobet, and Mitchell 2006), which
is mainly concerned with the optimal division of prots between se-
quential innovators. Generally, in these models, there are two innova-
tions that have to be introduced sequentially (the second innovation
cannot be introduced until the rst one has been introduced), and the
objective is to nd the patent policy that maximizes the incentives to
invest in both innovations. In this paper we generalize these models
by assuming that any innovation is based on n previous innovations.
We nd that the eect of increasing complexity on innovation activ-
ity depends on the degree of substitutability/complementarity between
these previous innovations.
Our contribution is to extend the analysis of optimal patent pol-
icy and optimal division of prots to the case in which the innovator
requires access to several prior inventions. In doing so, we link the
literature of sequential innovation to the literatures of complementary
monopoly and patent pools.
Cournot (1838) was the rst to analyze the complementary monopoly
problem. He modeled a competitive producer of brass who must buy
zinc and copper from two separate monopolists (zinc and copper are
perfect complements), and showed that (i) the price of the inputs is
higher than the price that a single provider would set, (ii) the total
cost of the inputs is increasing in the number of inputs, (iii) in the
limit, as n ! 1 the cost of the inputs is such that the demand for the
nal good is zero.
This analysis has been later extended in various directions. Son-
nenschein (1968) showed that the Cournot's theory of complementary
monopoly is the dual of its theory of duopoly with quantity competi-
tion and homogeneous goods, when the marginal cost of production is
zero. Bergstrom (1978) built upon this intuition to extend the duality
result to imperfect substitutes. Recently, Boldrin and Levine (2005a)
applied the structure of complementary monopoly to a model of se-
quential innovation: they set up a model of one innovation building
upon a number of (perfect complementary) previous innovations, and
show that as this number increases the cost of innovating also increases,
eventually hitting the upper bound for which the innovation is no longer
protable. We extend the analysis to a framework of oligopoly with
any degree of substitutability. This generalization is relevant because
it allows us to study the joint eect of the number of oligopolists and
the degree of substitutability on the probability of innovation. In par-
ticular we nd that, when the research inputs are market complementsANTICOMMONS IN SEQUENTIAL INNOVATION 5
(i.e. not only when they are perfect complements), the probability of
innovation decreases in the complexity of innovation.
Cournot's theory has also been used by the literature on patent pools.
Shapiro (2001) was the rst to suggest that patent pools may be an-
ticompetitive when they are formed by substitute patents, and pro-
competitive when formed by complementary patents. Lerner and Ti-
role (2004) built a model to generalize Shapiro's results for imperfect
substitutability. Given the similarity between our model and Lerner
and Tirole's, in Section 5 we present an analysis of the eect of patent
pools on innovation. We nd that Lerner and Tirole's results generalize
to our case also. However, given that in our model input decisions are
continuous, we can be more precise in our denition of complementar-
ity, which complements previous analysis.
However, it is important to remark that, even though our model is
related with Lerner and Tirole's, our focus is completely dierent. We
are interested in analyzing the eect of increases in n on the optimal
patent policy, while they are interested in the eects of price collusion
on innovation and welfare for n xed.
2. The model
There are n research inputs (x1;:::;xn) and a potential innovator
who may use the n inputs in R&D in order to invent a new good. The
n inputs have already been invented and are ready to be produced.
We make this assumption in order to concentrate on the eects of the
pricing of old ideas on innovation activity. In Section 4 we will extend
the model to see what happens when the n inputs have to be invented
as well.
The structure of Intellectual Property Rights is such that each input
is protected by a patent, granting its owner a monopoly over it. Each
patent is owned by a dierent patentee and thus each of the n inputs is
supplied by a dierent producer. Given that the inputs are imperfect
substitutes of each other, the factor market is a dierentiated goods
oligopoly. The input sellers compete in prices and the value of the
innovation is private information of the innovator.
2.1. Technology. The innovator can perform R&D to invent a new
nal good according to the following CES technology:
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where y is a measure of the R&D eort, A is a scale parameter, xi is
the amount of input i used, n is the number of inputs and  2 ( 1;1]
is a technological parameter related to the substitutability between the
inputs.
We will nd easier to work with the elasticity of substitution  =
1=(1   ). As is well known,  = 0 represents perfect complements,
0 <  < 1 represents imperfect substitutes, and  ! 1 represents
perfect substitutes.
The innovator faces an indivisibility problem, meaning that a min-
imum amount of R&D eort is required to invent a new good. When
the R&D eort is below that threshold level there is no innovation.
Without loss of generality we can set the threshold level at 1, so that
the indicator function for the innovation is:
I =

1 if y  1;
0 otherwise.
We set the scale parameter A in (1) equal to n( 1)= in order to
eliminate any returns from specialization or division of labor. Usually
CES production functions exhibit a property called increasing returns
to specialization (or love for variety in the case of utility functions).
Following an argument similar to Romer (1987), suppose that the pro-




1=, and let X be the total quantity
of inputs used in production. Because of symmetry, all inputs will be
used in the same quantity in the equilibrium, so xi = X=n for all i, and
output will be equal to y = n(1 )= X. There are positive returns to
specialization because an increase in n holding X constant causes out-
put to increase. We eliminate this eect by introducing A = n( 1)=
in the production function.
The complexity of the innovation is measured by n. More complex
technologies use a larger number of components or require more re-
search tools in order to be developed. Each input is produced with a
constant marginal cost of " > 0. We assume that the resources used
to produce inputs are sold in a competitive market, so that the private
and the social cost of producing inputs coincide. The assumption of no
returns to specialization guarantees that the social cost of performing
the innovation does not change as technologies become more complex.
In other words, there is no technological advantage or disadvantage
from increases in n.
In section 2.4 we will provide the intuition behind our innovation
technology. Before we do it, let us continue with the description of the
model.ANTICOMMONS IN SEQUENTIAL INNOVATION 7
2.2. Value of the innovation and structure of the information.
The social value of the innovation, v, is the total surplus generated by
the new product. To focus on the factor market, we will assume that
the innovator is a perfect price discriminator in the nal goods market.
This means that the revenue of the innovator coincides with the social
value of the innovation.
The value of the innovation is private information of the innovator.
This may be because the innovator has better information about the
characteristics of the new product or about the valuation of the con-
sumers. The sellers of inputs only know that v has a cumulative dis-
tribution F(v). Therefore F(v) is the probability that the innovation
has a return less or equal to v. In Section 6 we show that the assump-
tions of perfect price discrimination and asymmetric information can
be relaxed without altering the results.
The hazard function is dened as h(v) = f(v)=(1 F(v)), where f(v)
is the density function corresponding to F(v). In order to guarantee the
quasi-concavity of the maximization problem of the input producers,
the following assumption will hold throughout the paper:
Assumption 1 (Nondecreasing hazard function). h(v) > 0 and h0(v) 
0 on a support [v;  v], and h(v) = 0 outside of this support.
This assumption on the hazard function is very general, and holds
for most continuous distribution functions. Notice that we are not
restricting v nor  v to be of nite value.
An important assumption is that the distribution of values of the
innovation does not change with n. This assumption, together with
the absence of returns to specialization in the R&D technology imply
the following lemma:
Lemma 1. The probability that an invention is socially optimal does
not depend on its complexity.
Proof. The probability that an innovation is socially optimal is the
probability that its social value is larger or equal than its social cost.
The social cost of an innovation coincides with the resources used to
produce it. Therefore, the probability that an innovation is socially
optimal is Prob(v  
Pn
i=1 "xi  0). Because of the symmetry in the
innovation technology, xi = 1=n, so this probability becomes 1 F("),
which depends on the distribution of social values of the innovation
and the marginal cost of the inputs but not on the number of inputs
used in R&D.
In this paper, we are interested in studying the eects of increasing
technological complexity on the probability of innovation. Lemma 18 LLANES AND TRENTO
assures that a change in n aects this probability only through a change
in the number of inputs used in research, but not through a change in
the social value or cost of the innovation. In other words, we want
to compare innovations with dierent n but the same net social value.
In Section 6 we relax these assumptions by letting the value of the
innovation be a function of n and allowing returns to specialization in
the R&D technology. We nd that the main results of the paper are
not signicantly aected by a change in these assumptions.
2.3. Market interaction. The players of the game are the n input
sellers and the innovator. A strategy for input seller i is a choice of price
for her input. A strategy for the innovator is a function g : Rn
+  v !
Rn
+, namely a demand xi for each input, as a function of the price of
all the inputs and the realization of the value of the innovation.
The timing of the game is as follows: (i) the input producers simul-
taneously set the price of their inputs, (ii) Nature extracts a value v
from the distribution F(v), and (iii) given prices, the innovator calcu-
lates the input mix that minimizes the cost of innovation and decides
whether to innovate or not.
The equilibrium concept we use is Symmetric Subgame Perfect Equi-
librium (SSPE). A set of strategies fpign
i=1;g is a SSPE if it is a Nash
equilibrium of every subgame of the original game, and pi = p for all i.
The payo for input producer i is xi (pi ") and the payo of the
innovator is I v  
Pn
i=1 pi xi.
2.3.1. Innovator's Problem. Given input prices fpign
i=1, the innovator

















The solution to this problem is the set of conditional factor demands
xi and the minimum cost of innovation c. Given c, the innovator will
perform the innovation (I = 1) if v  c.
2.3.2. Input Seller's Problem. When setting the price the sellers of in-
puts do not know the realization of v. They only know that given
fpign
i=1 the probability that v  c (the probability of innovation) is
1 F(c). Therefore, the expected demand of input rm i is E(xi) =ANTICOMMONS IN SEQUENTIAL INNOVATION 9
(1 F(c))xi, and its Prot Maximization Problem (PMP) is:
max
pi
i = (1   F(c))xi(pi   ");
where both c and xi come from the CMP of the innovator.
2.4. Interpretation of the innovation technology. The CES spec-
ication of the R&D technology is a simple and general way to intro-
duce substitutability and complementarity between the inputs used
in research. In our model, ideas have economic value because they
are embodied in physical objects (Romer 1990, Boldrin and Levine
2002, 2005b). The innovator uses these physical objects to innovate,
not the abstract ideas. Accordingly, the input decision is not discrete
(to use the idea or not), but rather continuous (the research inputs can
be used in variable amounts).
Our description of the R&D process is a good description of many
innovation technologies. First, we can think that the inputs are used in
R&D in variable amounts, and once the innovation is performed they
are no longer needed. This interpretation ts well for sectors that use
a large number of research tools, like biomedical research, where the
use of clones and cloning tools, laboratory equipment and machines,
reagents, computer software and many other research instruments is
required in R&D, and can be used in variable amounts.
The second interpretation is that inputs are actually components of
the nal innovation, and are used to produce each copy of it. This
interpretation resembles more the case of already patented code lines
used in new software, hardware components for computers, and a vari-
ety of cases in electronics, semiconductors and other similar industries.
In the early radio industry, for example, according to Edwin Armstrong
(inventor of FM radio) \it was absolutely impossible to manufacture
any kind of workable apparatus without using practically all of the
inventions which were then known", like the high-frequency alterna-
tor, high-frequency transmission arc, magnetic amplier, the crystal
detector, diode and triode valves, directional aerial, etc.
Under this second interpretation there is a continuum of perfectly





1= and perfect competition assures that the price of
the nal output is equal to its marginal cost c =
Pn
i=1 pi xi. Then,
the demand of the nal good is y = 1   F(c), where y and c are the
quantity and price of the nal good.
The two interpretations lead to exactly the same results, except that
in the second one there is a welfare loss from the anti-competitive
pricing in the inputs market (the welfare loss would be approximately10 LLANES AND TRENTO
equal to (c   ")(F(c)   F("))=2). For expositional purposes, we will
stick to the rst interpretation.
Obviously, our research technology is not a good description of all
possible innovation processes. In particular, it does not t the case in
which the innovator pays only for the permission to use an idea. An
elegant alternative formulation is to consider discrete input choices (1
if the input is used and 0 otherwise). This is the approach followed
by Lerner and Tirole (2004). In this case, the innovator uses either
embodied or abstract ideas, and pays input innovators to have access
to these ideas.
In Section 5 we show that our model can be interpreted as a \smooth"
version of Lerner and Tirole's. Plainly, the advantage of our approach
is tractability. Continuity allows us to use dierential calculus, which
greatly simplies our subsequent analysis of the eect of an increase
in the number of inputs. The best argument to show that our results
would still hold if we were to assume discrete input choices is to notice
the similarity of the conclusions of both models on the eect of patent
pools when n is xed.
3. Equilibrium
In this section we solve recursively for the SSPE. Therefore, we begin
by solving the Innovator's Problem (second stage of the game). The de-
mands are those of a typical CES production function. The conditional
demand of input i and the cost of innovation are:
























where  = 1=(1 ) is the elasticity of substitution between the inputs.
The innovator will introduce the new good (I=1) if v  c.
The restrictions on  imply that the elasticity of substitution  goes
from 0 (perfect complements) to 1 (perfect substitutes).
Given xi and c, the symmetric equilibrium price p solves
p = argmax
pi"
(1   F(c)) xi (pi   ");






i + (n   1)p1  1
1  and xi = n 1 p
 
i c. It is
useful to notice that in the symmetric equilibrium (pi = p for all i),
c = p and xi = 1=n for all i. Also, p  " in equilibrium becauseANTICOMMONS IN SEQUENTIAL INNOVATION 11
otherwise rms would be making negative prots and would nd it
protable to deviate by setting a higher price.
Because of the nature of Nash equilibria, for any value of n, ", and
 < 1 there exists equilibria where p is so high that the probability
of innovation is zero (i.e. prots are zero for all input sellers) but
any deviation by a single input seller is not enough to make it positive.
However, these are trivial equilibria coming from the denition of Nash
equilibria without any intrinsic economic value. We are interested in
the existence of equilibria with a positive probability of innovation
(p <  v).
The following proposition characterizes the solution of the rst stage
of the game (the Input Seller's Problem).
Proposition 1. A SSPE with positive probability of innovation (p <  v)
exists and is unique. The equilibrium price solves
(p   ")h(p) = n    (n   1)(p   ")=p:
The conditional input demand is x = 1=n, the cost of innovation is
c = p and the probability of innovation is 1   F(p).
Proof. The rm wants to maximize (1 F(c))xi (pi "). The derivative








(pi   ") + xi

:
By Shepard's Lemma @c=@pi = xi, and by symmetry c = p, xi = 1=n




n2 + (1   F(p))

 







Now we prove that the solution cannot be " nor  v for n < 1. p = "
cannot be the equilibrium because D(") = (1   F("))=n > 0. Also,
p =  v cannot be the equilibrium both if  v is nite or innite. If  v < 1,





< 0. On the other hand, limp!1D(p) =
 1 < 0. Therefore, the solution must satisfy D(p) = 0. Multiplying
D(p) by  n2=(1   F(p)) we get:
(2) h(p)(p   ") +  (n   1)
p   "
p
  n = 0:
We can be sure that equation (2) has exactly one solution because it is
continuously increasing in p by Assumption 1, is negative when p = "
and is positive when p !  v (Assumption 1 implies that limp! v h(p)p =12 LLANES AND TRENTO
1 for nite or innite  v). Therefore, the solution exists and is unique.
Rearranging terms in equation (2) we get the desired result.
Example. We will nd it useful to illustrate the results with the help
on an example based on the uniform distribution. This example has the
advantage of providing an explicit solution for the equilibrium price.
Specically, assume that the value of the innovation, v, is uniformly
distributed between 0 and 1. This means that F(v) = v and h(v) =




a2 + 4 "(n 1)b
2b
;
where a = n + "   (n   1)(1 + ") and b = 1 + n(1   ) + . The cost
of innovation is equal to the price and the probability of innovation is
simply 1   p.
3.1. Elasticity of substitution. The price of the inputs and the cost
of innovation in equilibrium depend on the elasticity of substitution,
the complexity of the innovation and the marginal cost of the inputs.
In the following subsections we will analyze the comparative statics of
the above equilibrium.
Proposition 2. The cost of innovation is decreasing in .
Proof. Equation (2) provides an implicit function of p in terms of .
We can calculate @c=@ using the implicit function theorem (remember




(n   1)(p   ")=p
h(p) + h0(p)(p   ") +  (n   1)"=p2
It is easy to see that this derivative is always negative (the numerator
and the denominator are positive). The result follows.
Figure 1 depicts the cost of innovation (i.e. the price of the inputs)
as a function of  for the uniform distribution and for n = 10 and
" = 0:1.
The cost of innovation is monotonically decreasing in  because of
increased competition as the inputs become more substitutable. As
 ! 1 price converges to marginal cost ", which is the standard
Bertrand price competition result with homogeneous goods.
3.2. Complements and Substitutes. We will classify inputs in mar-
ket complements and substitutes according to the sign of the cross-price
derivative of expected demand which, in this setting, is equivalent toANTICOMMONS IN SEQUENTIAL INNOVATION 13
Figure 1. Cost of innovation as a function of .
analyzing the cross-price derivative of expected prot. This classica-
tion is equivalent to the one used in game theory, where the actions of
two agents are said to be complements (substitutes) when an increase
in the action of one of them implies a decrease (increase) in the payo
of the other agent. In our model, the actions are prices and the payo
is expected prot. Notice that this is an equilibrium denition since it
is based on the best response of the innovator.
Denition 1 (Market complements and substitutes). Input j is a mar-








An increase in the price of input j has two eects on the expected
demand of input i. On one hand, the conditional demand of input
i increases (substitution eect). On the other hand, the probability
of innovation decreases because the inputs are more expensive to the
innovator (innovation eect). The sign of the cross-price derivative de-











The rst eect is related to the standard substitution eect of con-
sumer demand theory. Remember that the Cost Minimization Problem
is equivalent to the Expenditure Minimization Problem and in this case
there are no wealth eects of price changes (the conditional factor de-
mands are equivalent to Hicksian demands). In principle, the derivative
@xi=@pj could be positive, negative or zero. However, the property of
negative semideniteness of the matrix of cross-price derivatives (which
implies that every input must at least have one technical substitute),
together with the symmetry of the production function, implies that14 LLANES AND TRENTO
this derivative is non-negative. The inputs will be technical substi-
tutes (@xi=@pj > 0) except in the case of perfect complements, where
@xi=@pj = 0.
The second eect is due to the fact that the demand for inputs is
downward sloping in the cost of innovation. The cost of the inputs used
in research aects the protability of innovation. Therefore, an increase
in the price of any input will lower the probability of innovation. This
eect is negative, except in the case of perfect substitutes, when it is
zero.
Now that our denition of complementarity and substitutability is
clear, we can be precise in our exposition. In what follows when we
say that inputs are complements or substitutes, we mean that they are
market complements or substitutes. We will see that the distinction
between complements and substitutes is crucial for the predictions of
the model.
The following lemma shows the value of  that makes the cross-price
derivative equal to zero.
Lemma 2. The cross-price derivative @E(xi)=@pj is zero in the sym-






=    1.
Proof. The cross-price derivative is:
@E(xi)
@pj




By Shepard's Lemma, @c=@pj = xj. Imposing symmetry, xi = xj =












This will be zero in the symmetric equilibrium only when h(p) = =p.
Introducing this into the rst order condition (2) and rearranging we
get (p   ")=p =  1 or p = "=(   1). Plugging this value of p in
h(p) = =p we get the desired result.
The following proposition classies inputs in complements and sub-
stitutes according to Denition 1. It is interesting to see that this
distinction depends on the values of  and ", but not on the value of
n.
Proposition 3. In the symmetric equilibrium, inputs are complements
when  <  and substitutes when  > .ANTICOMMONS IN SEQUENTIAL INNOVATION 15
Proof. We know from Lemma 2 that the cross-price derivative is zero
when  =  and that its sign depends on =p   h(p). The latter
expression is increasing in  because p is decreasing in  from Propo-
sition 2 and h is non-decreasing in p from Assumption 1. The result
follows.
Interestingly, the value of  which divides inputs in complements
and substitutes has to be larger or equal than 1. To see this, suppose
that  < 1. This means that h("=(   1)) < 0, which is not
possible. In the case of the uniform distribution, for example, inputs
are complements when  < (1 + ")=(1   ") and substitutes when  >
(1 + ")=(1   ").
3.3. Increasing complexity. Proposition 4 shows that the sign of the
eect of an increase in the complexity of the innovation (n) depends
on whether the inputs are complements or substitutes.
Proposition 4. The cost of innovation increases as innovation be-
comes more complex if the inputs are complements ( < ) and de-
creases if the inputs are substitutes ( > ).
Proof. We are looking for the eect of a unit increase in n, but it
will suce to determine the sign of @c=@n. Equation (2) provides an
implicit function of c in terms of n. Therefore, we can calculate @c=@n




1    (p   ")=p
h0(p)(p   ") + h(p) + (n   1)"=p2
We know that the denominator is always positive. Therefore, the sign
of this derivative depends on the sign of the numerator.
From equation (2) we get the following relation in equilibrium  (p 
")=p = (n   h(p)(p   "))=(n   1). Introducing this in the numerator
and operating, it becomes (h(p)(p   ")   1)=(n   1). We know that
h(p)(p   ") = 1 when  =  from the proof of Proposition 8. Given
that h(p)(p ") is increasing in p, it is decreasing in . Therefore, the
numerator is positive when  <  and it is negative when  > .
The result follows.
The probability of innovation is simply 1   F(c), so it moves in an







As before, the eect on the probability of innovation of an increase in
the complexity of innovation depends on the substitutability between16 LLANES AND TRENTO
the inputs. If inputs are complements, then the probability decreases
as n increases. If inputs are substitutes, then the probability increases
as n increases.
Figure 2 shows what happens in the uniform distribution example
as the complexity of the innovation increases from n = 5 to n = 15,
for " = 0:1. The cost schedules cross when  = 1:22, which is exactly
 = (1 + ")=(1   "). This means that the cost of innovation increases
if the inputs have low substitutability and decreases in case of high
substitutability.
Figure 2. Eects of an increase in the complexity of
innovation.
Proposition 4 says that patents are very harmful when innovation
is sequential and the research inputs are essential or dicult to sub-
stitute, but do not pose an important problem when inputs are easily
replaceable.
Figure 3a shows cost as a function of n for complementary inputs
and " = 0:1 in the case of the uniform distribution. As innovation
becomes more complex, the cost of innovation increases and converges
to 1 when n ! 1. This means that the probability of innovation
decreases with n and converges to 0. Convergence is faster when  gets
closer to zero. When the substitutability between the inputs is very
low ( close to zero), the probability of innovation is very small even
for simple innovations (low n).
Figure 3b shows that the conclusions change when the research in-
puts are substitutes. In this case the cost of innovation decreases when
the complexity of innovation increases (i.e. the probability of innova-
tion increases with n).
3.4. High complexity and monopolistic competition. It is inter-
esting to analyze the equilibrium of the economy when n ! 1 for twoANTICOMMONS IN SEQUENTIAL INNOVATION 17
(a) Complements. (b) Substitutes.
Figure 3. Cost of innovation as a function of n.
reasons. First, n ! 1 represents innovations that are highly complex
and therefore require a large number of inputs to be developed. The
innovator faces a patent thicket and has to gather inputs from many
patentees. We know how the probability of innovation changes as n
increases, but it is interesting to determine in what cases it will go to
0 or 1   F("). Second, in this limiting economy there is an innite
number of input sellers, so the eect of a price change by a single rm
has a innitesimal impact on the cost of innovation, and the market
becomes monopolistically competitive.
Proposition 5 characterizes equilibria with positive probability of
innovation (p <  v). In this case there are values of  for which there is
no equilibrium with positive probability of innovation.
Proposition 5. A SSPE with p <  v exists only when  > ^  where
^  =  v
 v ". The equilibrium price and cost of innovation are p = 
 1 ".












  1 = 0:
As n ! 1, the term with the hazard function goes to zero. This is
because each rm becomes negligible and does not aect the probability







  1 = 0:
Therefore, p = 
 1 ", which is between " and  v only when  >  v=( v  
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It is interesting to comment on three characteristics of the equilib-
rium. First, any p   v is an equilibrium for any value of  in this
limiting economy. If p   v the probability of innovation is zero, but
if a single input seller deviates, its impact on the cost of innovation
is innitesimal, so the probability of innovation (i.e. expected prots)
remains unchanged. Therefore, there are no protable deviations when
p   v.
Second, the equilibrium quantity xi goes to zero as n ! 1. This is
because the number of inputs is increasing towards innity but the total
quantity of inputs required is keeping constant, given our assumptions
on the innovation technology.
Finally, it is easy to show that 1  ^  < . The rst inequality
follows trivially from the fact that ^  =  v=( v   "). Therefore, ^  = 1
only when  v ! 1 or " = 0. For the second inequality, it is enough to
compare the equilibrium price when  = ^  with the equilibrium price
when  = , since price is decreasing in . When  = ^ , price is
equal to  v. When  =  we know that the equilibrium price solves
h(p)(p ") = 1. If p =  v, then h(p)(p ") ! 1, which is much larger
than 1. For h(p)(p ") to decrease and approach 1, p has to decrease.
This means that equilibrium price is larger with ^  and therefore ^  < .
Figure 4 shows the cost schedule as a function of  when  v = 1 and
" = 0:1. The equilibrium of the limiting economy does not depend on
the distribution of v, but it depends on the upper bound of the support
of the distribution.
Figure 4. Cost of innovation in the limiting economy.
The equilibrium price is the same than Dixit and Stiglitz's (1977)
monopolistic competition model. When inputs are substitutes, rms
set a mark-up over marginal cost equal to 1=(   1). This meansANTICOMMONS IN SEQUENTIAL INNOVATION 19
that the pricing ineciency decreases as n increases, but it does not
disappear even when n ! 1.
For complements, the outcome depends on whether  is greater or
less than ^  =  v=( v  "). When  >  v=( v  "), rms set a mark-up just
like in the substitutes case. When    v=( v   "), the only equilibria
have p   v and so the probability of innovation is zero. In this case, as
n increases the ineciency due to monopoly pricing increases and it is
at its maximum when n ! 1.
3.5. The tragedy of the anticommons revisited. The model pre-
sented in this paper gives a formal treatment to the tragedy of the
anticommons in sequential innovation. An anticommon (Heller 1998)
arises when multiple owners have the right to exclude each other from
using a scarce resource, causing its inecient under-utilization. This
problem is symmetric to the tragedy of the commons, where multi-
ple owners have the right to use a scarce resource, but nobody has
exclusion rights and resources tend to be overused.
Heller and Eisenberg (1998) have raised the question whether the
tragedy of the anticommons may apply to innovation in biomedical
research. They point out that in this sector excessive patenting of
research tools might reduce the incentive to innovate, because the in-
novator has to face a possibly high cost of bundling all the licenses
together. This is a concern that might be shared by other hi-tech
sectors where innovation follows a similar cumulative process.
The model presented above predicts that anticommons may arise in
sequential innovation, but only under certain circumstances. In our
model, the scarce resource is the state-of-the-art technology for inno-
vation, over which each patent holder of a research input has a claim.
Each patent holder decides the selling price of her input. It is interest-
ing to notice that when   1 all the inputs are essential to perform the
innovation so all the input sellers can potentially impede the innovation
by setting a high price.
Proposition 4 shows that, when the inputs are market complements,
the cost of producing an innovation increases as technologies become
more complex. This proposition says that when the number of patented
and complementary research tools to be used in R&D increases, the
probability of innovation is reduced: that is, anticommons applies to
sequential innovation when research inputs are market complements.
This result holds not only for perfect complementarity between the in-
puts, but whenever the elasticity of substitution is not suciently large
to compensate the negative eect of price changes on the probability of20 LLANES AND TRENTO
innovation. The opposite is true when research tools are market sub-
stitutes: in this case there is no anticommons because, as the number
of research inputs increases, competitive pressure reduces their price
fast enough to reduce also the cost of innovation.
Proposition 5 reinforces the previous result: when the number of
patented research tools grows large, and they are highly complemen-
tary, the anticommons is so strong that the probability of innovation
goes to zero.
Finally, it is important to remark that the anticommons eect arises
in the absence of any kind of transaction costs. The anticommons arise
as a natural consequence of the uncoordinated market power of the
input producers. As we will see in section 6.2, asymmetric information
is not essential for our results. All we need is a downward sloping
expected demand for the inputs.
4. Patent policy
We have shown that strong patents and fragmentation of ownership
lead to a low probability of innovation when inputs used in research are
complementary. The government could reduce the patent thicket by
granting less patents, or by reducing the breadth of the patents. How-
ever, weaker patents imply a reduced incentive to discover research
inputs in the rst place. The problem of the division of prot between
sequential innovators has been studied by Scotchmer (1991), Green and
Scotchmer (1995), Chang (1995), Scotchmer (1996) and Hopenhayn,
Llobet, and Mitchell (2006). In this section we complement existing
literature by analyzing the optimal division of prots between sequen-
tial innovators when the nal innovation requires multiple inputs to be
performed. Our objective is to determine the eects of higher complex-
ity on the optimal patent policy.
The innovation technology is the same as the one in section 2. For
tractability, we focus on the perfect complements case, so the nal good
can only be introduced only if all inputs are invented. Without loss
of generality (for the  = 0 case), we assume that once the inputs are
invented they can be reproduced at zero marginal cost (" = 0). Finally,
we will concentrate on the uniform distribution case, v  U[0;1], which
provides linear demands for the innovation.
An important dierence with Section 2 is that now the n inputs must
be invented at an earlier stage. We assume that there is a xed (sunk)
cost K=n of inventing the inputs. Each input will be introduced if
expected revenues are larger than the xed cost. As is standard in the
literature of sequential innovation, the 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unknown to the policy maker. All the policymaker knows is that the
sunk cost has a distribution K  U[0;  K]. Therefore, the patent policy
cannot depend on the realization of K.
Our assumptions imply that the social cost and value of the innova-
tion do not change as n increases. All that changes is the number of
input producers with which the nal innovator has to agree to perform
her innovation.
We introduce a patent policy parameter  2 [0;1]. This policy pa-
rameter can be interpreted as the patent breadth, the novelty require-
ment, or the strength with which Intellectual Property law is enforced
in courts: there is a probability  that the input innovator is granted
a patent and that the patent can be successfully defended in court.
We also assume that imitation is costless: Bertrand competition will
ensure that inputs not protected by patents are sold at marginal cost.
Consequently the innovator only has to pay a non-competitive license
fees for inputs that are covered by patents, and can buy the rest at
marginal cost.
We will rst analyze the case in which patent policy aects only
input innovators (rst stage innovations). In this section therefore we
abstract from the fact that in some cases the same patent policy should
apply to the nal (second stage) innovation. This is standard in the
literature on sequential innovation where the focus is on the eect of
patents on the optimal division of prots between rst and second stage
innovators. For completeness, in Section 4.2 we will analyze what hap-
pens when patents apply equally to rst and second stage innovations
(symmetric patent policy). We will show that the qualitative results
do not change.
The timing of the game is as follows: (i) input innovators observe
the sunk cost of innovation, and decide whether to invent their input
or not, (ii) if all inputs are invented, Nature decides which inputs are
protected by patents, (iii) patent holders set a price for their patented
inputs, (iv) Nature decides the value of the innovation, (v) the nal
innovator decides whether to innovate or not.
Research inputs will be invented only if the expected revenue from
selling the input is higher than the sunk cost of inventing it. Expected
revenue depends on whether they are granted a patent and on how
many other patents are granted. Remember that each input innovator
is granted a patent with probability . Suppose m patents are granted
in the second stage. Then, the price of the inputs, the cost of innovation
and the probability of innovation are, respectively: pm = n
m+1, cm =
m
m+1 and Prm = 1
m+1.22 LLANES AND TRENTO
Consider an input innovator who is granted a patent. In the third
stage, her revenues depend on how many other patents have been
granted. Let k = m   1 denote the number of patents granted, in ad-
dition to the patent of the input innovator we are considering. Actual
revenues (after uncertainty is resolved) are k = 1=(k +2)2. Expected
revenues are:






2 (n   1)!




There are two eects of increases in  on E(). First, a higher 
increases the probability of being granted a patent, which increases
E(). Second, the increase on  increases the probability that more
patents are granted in addition to mine, which decreases E() because
of the anticommons eect. Our simulations indicate that the rst ef-
fect always dominates the second eect for n small, so that E() are
increasing in . For larger n, though, the second eect dominates the
rst for large , so E() rst increases and then decreases with . Fig-
ure 5 shows the expected revenue of input producers as a function of
patent strength for n = 5.
Figure 5. Expected revenues for inputs. n=5
Let us now focus on how patent policy aects the probability of
innovation. In order for the nal innovation to be introduced, two
things must happen: (i) expected revenues have to be larger than the
xed cost for the input sellers, and (ii) the value of the innovation for
the nal innovator has to be larger than the cost of paying the inputs
protected by patents. The probability that (i) happens is Pr(E() >ANTICOMMONS IN SEQUENTIAL INNOVATION 23
K=n) = nE()=  K. The expected probability that (ii) happens is:













It is easy to see that E(Pr(v > c)) is decreasing in . This is because,
assuming the inputs are invented, a higher  increases the probability
that more patents are granted, which implies a lower probability of
introducing the nal innovation due to the anticommons problem.
The probability of introducing the nal innovation is simply the
















Figure 6 shows that the probability increases with respect to ,
reaches a maximum (for the optimal policy *), and then decreases,
for n = 5. There are two eects pulling in opposite directions: on one
hand increasing  increases the probability of inventing the inputs, on
the other hand it increases the cost of the nal innovator.
Figure 6. Probability of nal innovation. n=5
Interestingly, the policy that maximizes Pr is smaller than the policy
that maximizes E(). This is because is always decreasing in . This
has an implication for rent seeking activities: at the optimal policy,
input innovators would push for stronger patents on research inputs,
and nal innovators would push for weaker patents.
The following proposition presents the most interesting result of this
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Proposition 6. The optimal patent strength is decreasing in the com-
plexity of the innovation.
Proof. Rather than going though an analytical proof, it suces to an-
alyze Figure 7. This gure shows the policy that maximizes the prob-
ability of innovation, as a function of n. Given that the optimal policy
does not depend on  K or any other parameter, this actually shows the
eect of increases on n on , which is clearly decreasing.
Figure 7. Increasing complexity and optimal patent strength
In models of sequential innovation, the degree of patent protec-
tion determines the division of prots between sequential innovators.
Stronger patents increase the protection for early innovators, as they
grant them a claim over following innovations. When innovation builds
on several prior inventions, the uncoordinated market power of earlier
patentees generates an anticommons eect. Proposition 6 shows that
as the number of claims increase, the anticommons gets worse, and the
optimal response is to reduce the degree of patent protection.
It is important to remark that in our model a minimum amount of
protection is always needed, otherwise input producers would have no
incentives to invent the inputs in the rst place. The important result,
however, is that the degree of patent protection should decrease as n
increases. In section 4.2 we will show that the same result holds in a
more sophisticated model where patent policy also aect the revenues
of the nal innovator.
4.1. Patent policy with imperfect substitutability. In this sec-
tion we relax any constraint on the substitutability between research
inputs, and allow it to vary between zero and innity. Any degree of
substitutability higher than one requires a positive marginal cost " for
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and would be able to innovate at zero cost. As before, inputs require
a xed cost of K=n to be invented, with K  U[0;  K], and v  U[0;1].
This setting represents a generalization of the analysis of Section 4.
However, the problem becomes analytically untractable, and we have
to resort to numerical simulations.
The results in this section are in line with those of Section 4: increas-
ing complexity reduces the optimal patent strength. Figure 8 shows the
optimal patent breadth  as a function of the elasticity of substitu-
tion , with " = 0:1 and  K = 0:4, for n = 5 and n = 10. Increasing n
reduces * for any , and the result holds for any n  2.
Another interesting result is that the optimal patent strength  is
increasing in . This is because substitutability increases competition
among input producers, thus reducing their ability to set a price above
the marginal cost. This is equivalent to redistribute revenues from
input producers to the nal innovator. In order to compensate for
this redistribution, and return to its optimal level, patents must be
strengthened. Notice however that, for this same reason, patents in
this case are less harmful as they provide a more limited market power.
Finally, it is interesting to note that there is some value of , larger
than 1, for which the optimal patent policy is 1, i.e. inputs have to be
protected with strong patents when the substitutability is very large.
Figure 8. Increasing complexity and optimal patent
strength for imperfect substitutes (" = 0:1;K = 0:4)
4.2. Symmetric patent policy. Here we complete the analysis of
section 4 by assuming that the patent policy also applies to the nal
good innovator: there is a probability  2 [0;1] that, if the nal inno-
vation is introduced, it will be protected by a patent. The expected
revenue of the nal innovator is v, where v  U[0;1] is the gross so-
cial value of the innovation, just as before. This change introduces an
additional factor in favor of strong patents: the expected private value26 LLANES AND TRENTO
of the innovation v, to be shared between the nal innovator and the
input producers, it is now increasing in patent strength.
The rest of the model is the same as in Section 4, so we focus on the
perfect complements case with linear demand for the nal innovation.
Research inputs need to be invented in a previous stage, with a xed
cost K  U[0;K], and the necessary condition for this to happen is
that expected prots from selling the input E(i) = (1   F(c=)) xi pi
are higher than this sunk cost of innovation. The timing of the game
is also left unchanged.
Interestingly enough, introducing this extension does not change our
results. Input producers completely internalize the eect of  on the
expected prots of the nal innovator, and leave the probability of
innovation unaected. When m inputs receive patent protection, in-





m+1. As has been said, the probability of innovation is the same:
Pr(v > c) = 1
m+1.
On the other hand, the revenue of a patent holder when k = m   1
additional patents are granted is now  times lower at

(1+k)2. This
obviously has a negative eect on the overall probability of getting the
nal innovation Pr = Pr(E() > K=n)E(Pr(v > c)). It also has a
positive eect on the level of the optimal patent strength (the one that
maximizes Pr). Still it does not aect the main result: optimal patent
strength is decreasing in the complexity of the innovation, as shown if
Figure 9
Figure 9. Increasing complexity and optimal patent
strength: the case of symmetric patent policy
This result reinforces the one in section 4, and gives an idea how
strong the anticommons eect is as technological complexity increases.
The result is even more remarkable when taking into account that, in
this model, the nal innovator is a perfect price discriminator. ThisANTICOMMONS IN SEQUENTIAL INNOVATION 27
implies that reducing patent strength reduces the expected producer
revenue (v) on a one-to-one basis, which we see as a realistic upper
bound on the impact of patents on the incentive to innovate.
5. Patent pools
Even though our objective is to analyze the optimal patent pol-
icy, it is interesting to analyze what would happen if research inputs
were priced cooperatively, either by a collective institution such as a
patent pool or by a single patent holder (monopolist) that owns all the
patents. This analysis is interesting because the USPTO (US Patents
and Trademarks Oce) itself has recommended the creation of patent
pools to ease the access to biotechnology research tools (Clark, Piccolo,
Stanton, and Tyson 2000).
For this analysis, we come back to the basic model of Section 2 (the
innovator requires n inputs, which are already invented and protected
by patents of innite breadth). Proposition 7 shows the equilibrium
price in this case. The dierence with the previous case is that now the
patent holder maximizes joint-prots and therefore takes into account
the cross-price eects between expected demands.
Proposition 7 (Patent Pool). The equilibrium price when all the in-
puts are priced cooperatively, p, is the argument that solves h(p)(p  
") = 1.
Proof. Given the symmetric input demands, the pool wants to sell a
symmetric bundle. Therefore xi = 1=n and pi = p for all i and the pool
wants to maximize total prots n(1   F(p))(p   "). The rst order
condition is n( f(p)(p   ") + 1   F(p)) = 0. Rearranging terms we
get the desired result.
Notice that p depends only on the functional form of h and the
value of ", but not on the values of  or n. The following proposition
compares the cost of innovation when the inputs are priced individually,
c, with that of a patent pool, p.
Proposition 8. The cost of innovation when the inputs are priced
non-cooperatively, c, is equal to that of a patent pool, p, when the
cross-price derivative is zero ( = ), it is larger when the inputs are
complements ( < ) and it is smaller when the inputs are substitutes
( > ).
Proof. We know from the proof of Lemma 2 that when  = , the
cross-price derivative is zero and  = ph(p). Replacing this in (2) and
rearranging we get h(p)(p   ") = 1, which is the cooperative result.28 LLANES AND TRENTO
Given that p is decreasing in , whereas p is independent of , p > p
when  <  and p < p when  > .
The dierence between cooperative and non-cooperative pricing is
that in the rst case the rms take into account the eect of an increase
in the price of one input on the demand for the rest. When  =  this
eect is zero so the price of the pool coincides with that of the non-
cooperative equilibrium. When  <  the eect is negative, so the
pool knows that an increase in price will decrease the demand for the
rest and will set a price smaller than the uncoordinated input sellers.
The opposite happens when  > .
In the case of the uniform distribution, the pool price is p = (1 +
")=2. Figure 10 compares this price with the non-cooperative price for
" = 0:1 and n = 5.
Figure 10. Cooperative and non-cooperative pricing.
Our results are similar to those found in Lerner and Tirole (2004).
As we discussed in Section 2.4, the dierence between the two papers is
that we have assumed that inputs are used in research in a continuous
fashion, while Lerner and Tirole (2004) consider discrete input choices
(1 if the input is used and 0 otherwise).
Under the latter approach, the equilibrium will depend on whether
the competition margin or demand margin bind. When the competi-
tion margin binds, if the input seller raises her price, her input would
be evicted from the bundle of patents bought by the nal innovator.
When the demand margin binds, the input seller can raise price with-
out excluding its input from the basket, but the overall demand for the
bundle would decrease.
These competition and demand margins are related to our substi-
tution and innovation eects. The substitution eect says that an
increase in the price of one of the inputs lowers the demand for that
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constant). The innovation eect says that an increase in the price of
an input lowers the overall demand for the basket of inputs (holding
the relative demand of the inputs constant).
Therefore, our model can be interpreted as a "smooth" version of
Lerner and Tirole's. In Lerner and Tirole, as inputs become more
complementary, it is more likely that the demand margin will bind.
In our model, both margins always bind (except when  = 0 or  !
1), but as inputs become more complementary, the innovation eect
becomes more important relative to the substitution eect.
In this sense, the contribution of our model is twofold: (i) we show
that Lerner and Tirole's results extend to the continuous innovation
technology case, and (ii) we explain the eects of patent pools on in-
novation using the traditional denition of complementarity based on
cross-price derivatives (precisely because the eects of price changes
are smooth), while Lerner and Tirole base their denition of comple-
mentarity on the shape of the revenue function of the innovator.
6. Extensions
In this section we analyze the consequences of relaxing some of the
basic assumptions of the model.
6.1. Social value and cost depend on complexity. Until now, we
have assumed that the distribution of values of the innovation and the
social cost of the inputs do not depend on n, and that there are no
returns from specialization. Under these assumptions, a change in n
only changes the number of producers from whom the innovator has to
buy the research inputs in order to innovate, but does not change the
probability that the innovation is socially valuable.
However, it could be argued that the revenues of the innovator or
the cost of the inputs are increasing or decreasing in n, or that a higher
number of inputs has a positive impact in the R&D technology due to
a higher division of labor. All these changes have equivalent eects on
the probability of innovation so we will concentrate on changes in the
distribution of returns of the innovation.
Let the return of the innovation be a(n)v, with a0(n)  0 or a0(n)  0
and limn!1 a(n) = a1 > 0. v has a cumulative distribution F(v)
as before. Notice that we are not setting an upper bound on a1.
All we require is that if a is non-increasing it does not go to zero as
n ! 1. This is because if a1 = 0 then the distribution of values of
the innovation will collapse to zero and the innovation will never be
protable when n is very large by assumption.30 LLANES AND TRENTO
The probability of innovation is 1   F(c=a), and in the symmetric
equilibrium c = p and x = 1=n. The equilibrium price of the inputs
(i.e. the cost of innovation) solves:
(p   ")h(p=a)=a = n    (n   1)(p   ")=p
but we are more interested in the ratio k = c=a, which enters in the
probability of innovation. Replacing in the previous equation we have:
(6) (k   "=a)h(k) = n    (n   1)(k   "=a)=k:
This equilibrium is equivalent to the one in Proposition 1, thinking of
k = c=a as the cost of innovation and "=a as the social cost of the
inputs. We can prove the same theorems as before with respect to the
dierence between complements and substitutes, the welfare eects of
patent pools and @k=@. However, @k=@n will be dierent because now
"=a is a function of n.










h0(k)(k   "=a) + h(k) + (n   1)("=a)=k2
As before, the sign of this derivative depends only on the sign of
the numerator, but now there is an additional term which shifts the
threshold value of  that divides positive and negative changes in k.
This threshold value will be to the left of  when a0(n) > 0 and to the
right of  when a0(n) < 0.
Two important remarks are in order. First, if a0(n) is large then the
last term in the numerator will determine the sign of the derivative. In
this case, the eect of changes in n on revenues completely overcomes
the eect on the pricing of inputs, and @k=@n has the opposite sign of
a0(n) irrespective of the value of . Second, even for small a0(n), when
a0(n) > 0 and  ! 1 the derivative is always positive. Therefore
when a0(n) is small and positive, there are two regions where @k=@n is
positive: one with low values of  and another with large values of .
According to the previous analysis, assuming that the return of the
innovation depends on n has an eect on the derivative of the prob-
ability of innovation with respect to n. Next, we will show that this
assumption has no signicant eect on the analysis of the equilibrium
as n ! 1.
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When n ! 1, the rst term will go to zero because a1 > 0. Therefore,
the equilibrium price is the same as before, p = 
 1 ", which is less
than the maximum possible revenue (a1  v) only if  > a1 v=(a1 v ").
When   a1 v=(a1 v   "), on the other hand, there is no equilibrium
price such that the probability of innovation is positive.
The probability of innovation is 1   F(p=a1). There are two possi-
ble cases. If a1 < 1 then the probability of innovation is less than
optimal, just as in the basic model. If a1 = 1 then the probability of
innovation will go to 1 for  > 1 and 0 for   1, which is the same as
assuming " = 0 in the basic model.
6.2. No asymmetric information. Another assumption of the ba-
sic model is that there is asymmetric information on the value of the
innovation (read Gallini and Wright 1990, Bessen 2004, for good dis-
cussions of why this assumption makes sense). However, our results
do not depend on the existence of asymmetric information. All that is
needed for the results is a downward sloping demand for innovations.
An alternative interpretation could be that there is a continuum of
innovators with decreasing returns to their innovations. Suppose that
the innovators are indexed by the return to their innovations, which
ranges between v and  v. Now, F(v) is the measure of innovations with
a return less or equal to v. Also, assume that the innovations do not
compete against each other in the nal goods market and that the input
sellers cannot price discriminate between the innovators. It is easy to
see that all the previous results translate directly into this setting. All
that changes is that now 1   F(c) is not the probability of innovation
but the measure of innovations performed.
6.3. No price discrimination. We can also relax the assumption
that the innovator is a perfect price discriminator. Dropping this as-
sumption introduces a wedge between the social and private values of
the innovation. This means that the distribution of values of innovation
changes, and that now there is also an ineciency in the nal goods sec-
tor. Assume that the social value of the innovation is still distributed
according to F(v), with probability density function f(v). The private
value of the innovation is now vp, which is less than the social value of
the innovation. With a linear demand for the nal good, for example,
the private return of the innovation would be vp = v=2, which has a
probability density function given by 2f(2vp). The qualitative results
are the same as before. All that changes is that now the probability of
innovation decreases for each value of , and so the values of , ^  and32 LLANES AND TRENTO
  increase. Also, the optimal patent protection is lower for each value
of  and n than in the case of perfect price discrimination.
6.4. Uncertain return of the innovation. We have also assumed
that the innovator is the only one that knows the value of the innova-
tion. In this section we ask what happens if v is also unknown to the
innovator. Formally, we do this by changing the timing of the game:
(i) the input producers simultaneously set the price of their inputs,
(ii) given prices, the innovator calculates the input mix that minimizes
the cost of innovation and decides whether to innovate or not, and (iii)
Nature extracts a value v for the innovation from the distribution F(v).
We begin by solving the second stage of the game. The innovator
decides what would be the optimal combination of inputs to perform
the innovation in case he decides to perform it. This leads to the
same cost of innovation and conditional demands as before. Then, the
innovator decides whether to perform the innovation or not, in order to
maximize expected prots E(v) c. The innovation will be performed
if E(v)  c and will not be performed otherwise. If E(v) < ", then the
innovation will never be performed, so we assume that E(v)  ". We
also assume that the innovator will perform the innovation if E(v) = c.
The uncertainty has now passed from the input sellers to the input
producer. The problem of the input sellers is deterministic, they know
E(v) and they know that if the price is higher than E(v) the innovation
will not be performed (i.e. their demands will be zero). Now, the
inputs are always market substitutes unless  = 0. It is easy to show
that the innovation will always be performed, and that the elasticity of
substitution only aects the distribution of payos between the input
sellers and the innovator.
Lemma 3 shows that input demands are discontinuous at a certain
price, and Proposition 9 proves that in the symmetric equilibrium c 
E(v) so the innovation is always performed.












Proof. The demand for inputs is positive if the cost of innovation is not
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If pi is larger than this value, then the innovation is not performed and
the demand for all inputs is zero.
The input sellers want to maximize prots xi (pi  "). Proposition 9
states the solution of the game.
Proposition 9. The equilibrium price when the return of the innova-
tion is uncertain for the innovator is:
p =
 (n 1)





Proof. After imposing symmetry, the derivative of xi (pi   ") with re-













Lemma 3 implies that if the derivative with respect to price is positive
at p = E(v), this is a symmetric equilibrium, as rms are making
positive prot, do not want to lower price (D  0), and would have a




When  > n
n 1
E(v)
E(v) ", on the other hand, the equilibrium price solves
the unrestricted rst order condition D(p) = 0.
7. Conclusion
In this paper we extend the literature of sequential innovation in
two directions. First, we study how the probability that an innovation
is privately protable changes as technologies become more complex,
and the inputs used in research are patented. We nd that the results
depend on the substitutability between these research inputs.
When the inputs are complements, the protability of the innovation
is decreasing in the technological complexity. In the limit (when n !
1), when the degree of substitutability is below a threshold level, which
is higher than 1, the innovation is never protable. This paper therefore
gives a formal treatment of the tragedy of the anticommons.
On the other hand, when the inputs are substitutes, the protability
of the innovation is increasing in technological complexity. Even in
this case, when n ! 1, the cost of gathering all the inputs for the34 LLANES AND TRENTO
innovation is always too high from a social point of view and thus the
probability of innovation is suboptimal.
Second, we study the optimal response of patent policy to increasing
complexity of innovation. We nd that, because of the anticommons
eect, the optimal degree of patent protection is decreasing in the com-
plexity of the innovation. The degree of patent protection determines
the division of prots between sequential innovators. Stronger patents
distribute more revenues from the last innovator to the previous innova-
tors. This result says that increasing complexity of innovation reduces
the optimal amount of protection granted to earlier innovators. This
result is very robust: numerical simulations suggest that it holds for
any degree of substitutability between previous innovations, and also
holds when patent protection aects the revenues of the nal innovator
(i.e patents also aect the amount of prots to be distributed between
successive innovators).
These results are at odds with respect to what we observe in the
real world: the complexity of technology is increasing but patents
are becoming stronger. Not only they have been recently extended
to sectors previously lacking protection (sexually reproduced plants,
software, business methods, products and processes of biotechnology,
including plants and animals). Also patent length has been increasing
over the years, and patent systems are being created in countries where
they did not previously exist. We think this is a contradiction worth
being studied further.
Finally, we also study what happens when inputs are priced coop-
eratively, either by a collective organization as a patent pool or by a
single owner of all the inputs. We nd that the cost of the innovation
decreases with respect to the non-cooperative pricing, when inputs are
market complements, while it increases when inputs are market sub-
stitutes. This result is in line with the intuition of Shapiro (2001) and
the model of Lerner and Tirole (2004). Still, we believe it complements
these previous papers by using a standard denition of complementar-
ity/substitutability, allowing us to exactly identify the economic forces
driving the result.
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